This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.
Preliminaries
In this section we provide the basic definitions and the setting of the game played.
A TU-game is a pair (N, w) , where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players and w : 2 N → R is a characteristic function which assigns to each coalition C ⊂ N its worth w(C), with the convention that w(∅) = 0. The set of all TU-games with player set N is denoted by G.
We consider a sequence of TU-games, played in time-periods t ∈ T = {1, . . . , T }, by the players in N . Now the characteristic function w t : 2 N → R assigns to each coalition C ⊂ N in each time-period t its worth w t (C), with w t (∅) = 0. Each player i ∈ N has an intertemporal utility function, u i : R T → R which assigns to every payoff stream
T of player i a utility level u i (x i ). A dynamic TU-game is therefore defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. A dynamic TU-game, denoted by Γ, is a tuple (N, T , w, u) , where w = (w 1 , . . . , w T ) and u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ).
The utility function u i is assumed to be continuous, weakly increasing in each coordinate, time-separable, and satisfies 
if and only if
Let u t denote the utility functions u t = (u i t ) i∈N , the collection of individual utility functions from t onwards.
Now the subgame of a dynamic TU-game can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. The subgame of a dynamic TU-game Γ starting at time period t is the dynamic TU-game Γ t = (N, t + , w t + , u t + ).
For a dynamic TU-game Γ, (Γ, C) will denote the restriction of the game to coalition C.
The central question in a TU-game is how to distribute the worth w(C) of a coalition C among its members if the coalition is formed. An allocation for a coalition C in Γ is a matrix x C = (x i ) i∈C ∈ R T ×C . The allocation for a coalition C at time-period t is x C t ∈ R C and an allocation stream for coalition C in time-periods from t onwards is denoted x C t + . The total amount of payoff of coalition C in time-period t is x t (C) = i∈C x i t , where x i t is player i's share. The total payoff stream for the coalition from t onwards is denoted by x t + (C).
Definition 2.3. An allocationx ∈ R
T ×N is efficient in the game Γ if
Note that this concept says more than the usual efficiency or feasibility conditions in TU games, since it requires i∈N x i t = w t (N ) to hold for all time-periods t ∈ T . We study which allocations are stable in a game Γ. In general, a given allocationx is stable if there is no time-period t ∈ T and no coalition C ⊂ N which has a profitable deviation fromx at time-period t. There are various ways in which the notion of profitable deviation might be formulated. Here we concentrate on profitable deviations related to the Weak Sequential Core.
The Weak Sequential Core
In this section we reproduce the definition of the Weak Sequential Core following Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) . Definition 3.1. An allocation x C t + ∈ R t + ×C is feasible for a coalition C at time-period t in the game Γ if
Note again that this concept says that the allocation must be feasible for coalition C in every time-period; it requires i∈C x i t = w t (C) to hold for all time-periods t from t onwards.
Definition 3.2. Let some allocationx be given. A coalition C can deviate fromx at a given time period t ∈ T if there exists a feasible allocation x C t + for coalition C at t such that
Since the utility functions are time-separable, the improvement in time-periodt is independent of the payoffs received beforet. Note also that we implicitly assume that once a coalition deviates, it can no longer collaborate with players outside the coalition for the rest of the time.
Definition 3.3. A deviation x
C t + as in Definition 3.2 is credible if there is no sub-coalition C ⊂ C and time-period t ≥ t such that C has a counter-deviation at t from x C t + , i.e. a feasible allocation streamx t + for C with u
Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) define the Weak Sequential Core as follows.
Definition 3.4. The Weak Sequential Core of the game Γ, denoted by WSC(Γ), is the set of feasible allocationsx for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a credible deviation.
Problem with the implications of WSC(Γ)
In this section we argue that if one follows the definitions of Section 3, the results of Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) may not hold. In particular we present a counter-example to their first result, Lemma 1.
First we re-state Lemma 1. Then we give an example, which proves Lemma 1 to be incorrect.
Lemma 1. Let Γ be a dynamic TU-game andx a feasible allocation for N . Then the following two statements are equivalent. (a)x ∈ WSC(Γ),
(b)x is such thatx 2 + ∈ WSC(Γ 2 ) and there is no C ⊂ N and allocation x C such that
Example 4.1. Consider a game with two time-periods and two players; T = {1, 2} and N = {1, 2}. Let the stage games be given by
Let the utility functions be
for both players. Consider the following allocation
This allocation would give both players a utility of u i (x i ) ≈ 0.3161. It is clear that no singleton coalition can deviate from the given allocation at any time, and also that the coalition {1, 2} cannot blockx at t = 2, since it is not possible to increase the utility of both players simultaneously. Thus it only remains to check if {1, 2} has a credible deviation x {1,2} at t = 1. For such a deviation it must hold that
To prevent counter-deviations by players 1 and 2 at t = 2 it should also hold that
It follows from Inequality (5) and feasibility that x 1 2 ≤ 0.1. Using Inequality (2) we find that
7699. By feasibility we obtain x 2 1 ≤ 0.2301. The deviation x 1,2 therefore satisfies
It follows that x {1,2} cannot be a credible deviation, since x defined by x = 0.455 0.545 0.455 0.545 is a counter-deviation for coalition {1, 2} at t = 1; u 1 (x 1 ) ≈ 0.3656 and u 2 (x 2 ) ≈ 0.4202. Although x itself is not credible, player 2 can counter-deviate from it in time-period 2, x makes any possible deviation by coalition {1, 2} at t = 1 not credible.
Thus the given allocationx is in the Weak Sequential Core of the game. Now we will show, by means of Example 4.1, that (a) of Lemma 1 does not imply (b).
We have seen that
is an element of the Weak Sequential Core, sox satisfies the conditions in (a). It is also clear that the first claim of (b) holds; i.e.x 2 + =x 2 = (0, 1) is in the Weak Sequential Core of the subgame starting in time-period 2. The rest of the claim however is not true. Consider the allocation x {1,2} defined by
, sox does not satisfy the conditions in (b). Thus it follows that (a) does not imply (b).
Remedy
Part (b) of Lemma 1 plays a very important role in the concept of Weak Sequential Core. Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) take (b) of Lemma 1 to define the Weak Sequential Core in their work on exchange economies and also Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) think of this condition as a crucial property of the WSC(Γ).
In this section we modify the definition of the Weak Sequential Core. Following Definition 4 in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) the authors argue that the existence of a deviation by C implies the existence of a credible counter-deviation by some coalition C , and so it is not necessary to require a counter-deviation by C to be credible; supporting both their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and the proof of Lemma 1.
Their argument proceeds as follows. Suppose that C has a counter-deviation x from x C that is not credible. One may assume that C itself does not have a counter-deviation from this deviation. Then there is a coalition C C that has a deviation x from x at a time-period t ≥ t . Next they claim that if x is a credible deviation from x then it is also a credible deviation fromx. However this claim does not hold.
Consider the counter-deviation x of C = {1, 2} at t = 1 in Example 4.1. This deviation is not credible, C itself does not have a deviation from it and C C = {2} does. Player 2 could deviate in time-period 2 with x 2 = w 2 ({2}) = 0.9 > 0.545. However, x is not a deviation fromx 2 2 = 1, providing a counter-example to the claim above.
The solution to the problem is to require the counter-deviation by C in Definition 3.3 to be credible at its turn. We propose to use a notion of credibility similar in spirit to the one defined by Ray (1989) , applied to our dynamic setting.
Definition 5.1 (Credible deviation for a singleton). Let some allocationx be given. A feasible allocation x
. Such a deviation is always credible for a singleton coalition. A 2-player coalition C has a credible deviation x C t + at time-period t if there is no singleton sub-coalition C C and time t ≥ t such that C has a credible deviation at t from x C t + . Therefore, recursively, a credible deviation for a coalition C is defined as follows.
Definition 5.2 (Credible deviation). Let some allocationx be given. A feasible allocation x
Such an x C t + is a credible deviation for coalition C at time-period t if there is no sub-coalition C C and time t ≥ t such that C has a credible deviation at t from x C t + . Now the definition of the Weak Sequential Core can be modified as follows.
Definition 5.3. The Weak Sequential Core of the game Γ, denoted by WSC(Γ), is the set of feasible allocationsx for the grand coalition from which no coalition ever has a credible deviation.
If one applies this modified definition of credibility to Example 4.1,x defined bȳ
is no longer an element of the Weak Sequential Core. Consider x {1,2} defined by
We claim that x {1,2} is a credible deviation fromx by coalition {1, 2} at t = 1. Indeed,
, and there is no deviation possible from x {1,2} by any singleton coalition at any time-period.
We show next that if one uses Definition 5.3 instead of Definition 3.4 to define the Weak Sequential Core, Lemma 1 is rescued.
First we introduce two lemmas, which will be useful for our proof of Lemma 1 under the modified definition of the Weak Sequential Core.
Lemma 5.4. If, for some t ∈ T ,x t + ∈ WSC(Γ t ), then it holds thatx
Lemma 5.4 follows immediately from the definition of the Weak Sequential Core, so the proof is omitted.
Lemma 5.5. Letx be an efficient allocation and let x
C be a credible deviation fromx by coalition C at time-period t = 1. Let D be the set of credible deviations y C fromx by C at t = 1 with the property that
Proof. First we show that D is closed. Consider a sequence (y
Clearlyȳ C is a deviation fromx by C at t = 1, so ifȳ C is not a credible deviation, then there is a credible counter-deviationŷ
n cannot be a credible deviation fromx by C at t = 1 either, thus (i) cannot hold.
The continuity of
Now we show that D is bounded. We define the set D t by D t = {y t + ∈ R t + ×C |y t + is a credible deviation fromx by C at t}.
for all i ∈ C is not required for y C to belong to D 1 . We use backwards induction to prove that D 1 is bounded, thereby completing the proof of the lemma. 
showing that D T is bounded.
. We show that D t is bounded. Suppose D t is not bounded from below. Then there exists a sequence (y C t + ,n ) n∈N with y C t + ,n ∈ D t such that, for some i ∈ C and for some t ≥ t,
, and therefore t = t. Then, given that the utility function is assumed to be time-separable and weakly increasing in each coordinate, it holds that
By Equation (1), we know that
and so by (7), we get
At the same time, credibility of y
, and we obtain a contradiction, so we have shown that D t is bounded from below. It follows that D t is also bounded from above, since y t + (C) = w t + (C).
2
Now we prove Lemma 1, using Definition 5.3 as the definition of the Weak Sequential Core.
Proof. (of Lemma 1)
First we show that (a) implies (b). The first part of (b) holds as stated in Lemma 5.4. We prove the second part by contradiction. Suppose there is C ⊂ N and x C such that
We show that if such a deviation x C exists, then there also exists a credible deviation fromx, thus contradicting (a). If x C is a credible deviation, then we are done, so suppose x C is not a credible deviation. Since x C 2 + ∈ WSC(Γ 2 , C), for x C not being credible, there must be a credible deviationx
C from x C at time-period t = 1 by a sub-coalition C C. But thenx C is also a credible deviation fromx at t = 1 by C since
We show next that (b) implies (a). Suppose (a) does not hold. Sincex 2 + ∈ WSC(Γ 2 ) by assumption, forx / ∈ WSC(Γ) to hold, there must be a credible deviation x C fromx by a coalition C at t = 1. We will show that then there also exists a credible deviationȳ C fromx by coalition C at t = 1 such thatȳ C 2 + belongs to WSC(Γ 2 , C), thereby violating (b). Let D be the set of credible deviations y C fromx by C at t = 1 with the property that
Since the allocation x C belongs to D, so D is non-empty, and we know from Lemma 5.5 that D is compact, the set of maximizers in (8) is non-empty.
We show thatȳ
C is a credible deviation, it is not possible that C C, so C = C. We show thatỹ C = (ȳ
(ii )ỹ C is a credible deviation fromx by coalition C at t = 1.
Part (i) follows from the time-separability of the utility functions, since we have that
, for all i ∈ C, forỹ C not to be a credible deviation fromx, there should be a coalition C C with a credible deviation z C t + fromỹ C at t . This leads to a contradiction when t ≥ t sinceŷ C t + is credible, and to a contradiction when t < t sinceȳ C is a credible. We have shown thatỹ C ∈ D. It follows that i∈C u i (ỹ i ) > i∈C u i (ȳ i ), which contradicts thatȳ C is a maximizer. We have shown thatȳ 
Conclusion
The original definition of the Weak Sequential Core for dynamic transferable utility games as proposed in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) is problematic since it is incompatible with the main characterization of the Weak Sequential Core. In turn, this characterization was used to define the Weak Sequential Core for economies with incomplete asset markets in Predtetchinski, Herings, and Perea (2006) . We propose a modification of the original definition under which the desired equivalence with the main characterization of the Weak Sequential Core is rescued.
